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CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS' SUITS: SUING STATE
OFFICERS UNDER SECTION 526a OF THE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Introduction
Recent revelations of wrongdoing by political figures in high office
have heightened concern over the accountability of elected officials and
their subordinates to the voting public. Similar instances of widespread
concern for improved standards of ethical and moral behavior within
the political system have recurred throughout American history. Many
of the fundamental concepts of representative government embedded in
the constitution have been refined in the wake of adverse reaction to
abuses of political power. For example, consider the reform of the
spoils system, the creation of the political convention, the development
of the political primary, the reforms of the Progressive Era, the ex-
tension of voting rights, the passage of the Freedom of Information
Act,1 and the formulation of the Watergate-inspired Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974.2
Nevertheless, the political process has failed in certain respects to
assure the accountability of public officials to those they serve. The
electoral system has not afforded the individual a truly effective means
of influencing official conduct. In the polling booth, the influence
which an individual exerts on his representatives remains conditional
upon membership in a voting majority. Government bureaucracies
may be even less accountable to the public interest because such en-
tities are further removed from the electoral process and thus often
less affected by movements for political reform. However, while politi-
cal institutions have failed to assure their true accountability, courts
have developed by common law and have acquired by statute procedures
by which the individual may exert day-to-day influence on the activities
of public officials.
This note will analyze the development in California of one of
the principal means by which a citizen can influence officers of state
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). The
Freedom of Information Act was a 1967 amendment to the Administrative Procedure
Act and provides any individual with a right of access to information in the govern-
ment's possession.
2. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. Much of the federal
election reform was declared unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976).
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government through the judicial process-taxpayers' suits. Such suits
provide the individual citizen with the means to enjoin wasteful or
illegal expenditures by public officers.8 The extent to which these
suits may be brought against state officers in California, however, has
only recently been clarified by the California Supreme Court in Stanson
v. Mott.' By contrast, taxpayers in California have been permitted
to obtain injunctions against municipal and county officers under case
authority since 1 8 5 8 5 and more recently under section 526a of the
Code of Civil Procedure. A great body of case law has developed under
section 526a which should be useful to the courts in refining the scope
of taxpayers' suits on the state level. The similarity between suits
brought under section 526a and those under the authority of Stanson
makes the precedents behind the code section appropriate considera-
tions for suits against state officers.
This note will focus upon section 526a to determine its impact on
state taxpayer suits. The first section will briefly examine the weak-
nesses of judicial alternatives to taxpayers' suits in California. Atten-
tion will then turn to the historical development of taxpayers' suits
in the United States. A further section will trace and analyze the Cali-
fornia common law precedents for suits against state officers in rela-
tion to the statutory authority provided by section 526a. Finally,
the note will cover the numerous judicial interpretations of section 526a
to determine what impact they may have on the manner in which Cali-
fornia taxpayers' suits against state officials will develop in the future.
Judicial Review of State Officers' Acts:
Traditional Procedures and Their Shortcomings
The taxpayer's suit is not a recent procedural invention.6 Sev-
eral related methods of influencing official conduct by resort to judicial
process, however, have received greater use in California. It is neces-
sary to consider these alternatives to taxpayers' suits to demonstrate
that they do not always provide adequate means for citizens to chal-
lenge alleged official misconduct.
3. CAL. CODE Cry. PROC. § 526a (West Supp. 1976).
4. 17 Cal. 3d 204, 222-33, 551 P.2d 1, 12-13, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 708-09 (1976).
For a discussion of this case, see notes 84-88 & accompanying text infra.
5. See Foster v. Coleman, 10 Cal. 278 (1858). The issue of taxpayer standing
to sue was not discussed in the case.
6. Taxpayers' suits were permitted in England as early as 1826. See Bromley
v. Smith, 57 Eng. Rep. 482 (Ch. 1826). They became more common with the passage
of the Municipal Corporations Act in 1835 under which municipal officials were deemed
to have a duty to manage funds as a public trust. See Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Sur-




The common law prerogative writs remain the traditional means
by which an individual may secure judicial review of officials' ac-
tions." Nevertheless, they are of limited use. For instance, most states
permit the review of actions of an administrative agency by the writ of
certiorari. 8  California, however, limits certiorari to suits against agen-
cies which have derived their power expressly from the state constitu-
tion. To remedy this procedural deficiency, California litigants have
substituted the action in mandamus'0 to achieve the same relief pro-
vided by the writ of certiorari in other states., By mandamus, an
individual citizen can compel a public official to perform a ministerial
act required by law,' to exercise discretion,' 3 or to refrain from abus-
ing his discretion. 4 However, mandamus is of limited use because it
cannot be employed to control the manner in which discretion is exer-
cised."' The use of mandamus is further limited to a petitioner who is
"beneficially interested" in controlling an official's conduct.' 6 Lastly,
7. The common law prerogative writs (mandamus, certiorari, habeas corpus, pro-
hibition, and quo warranto have been used by American courts to review administrative
decisions. However, they have come down through time heavily weighted with tech-
nicalities which sometimes obstruct the efficient and rational administration of justice.
See W. GELLHORN & C. BysE, ADMmsT&ATrv LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 150-51
(6th ed. 1974).
8. In California, the writ of certiorari is called the writ of review. CAL. CODE
CIv. PROC. § 1068 (West 1955).
9. See Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 6 Cal. 2d 557, 559, 59
P.2d 119, 120 (1936). The same judicial power would be required to prevent certain ad-
ministrative acts by a writ of prohibition. See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1102 (West Supp.
1976).
10. In California, the writ of mandamus is called the writ of mandate. CAL. CODE
Civ. PRoc. § 1084 (West 1955).
11. See 3 K. DAvis, ADMiNIsTRATmV LAw TnRETIsn 393 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIs]; CAL. CODE Crv. Pioc. § 1085 (West 1955).
12. See Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 13 Cal. 2d
75, 83, 87 P.2d 848, 853 (1939). .
13. See Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 884-85, 484 P.2d 1345, 1353, 95
Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1971). One exception is that a writ of mandate will lie to inquire
into the validity of discretionary final administrative orders or decisions but.only where
such conclusions are reached as a result of a proceeding in which a hearing is required
to be given and evidence is taken. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 1094.5 (West Supp. 1976).
14. See California Cotton Credit Corp. v. Superior Ct., 127 Cal. App. 472, 476,
15 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1932).
15. See Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 13 Cal. 2d
75, 83, 87 P.2d 848, 853 (1939).
16. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1086 (West 1955). California courts have not de-
fined "beneficially interested" other than by example. See, e.g., Parker v. Bowron, 40
Cal. 2d 344, 354-55, 254 P.2d 6, 11-12 (1953). In that case, the court denied the
writ, saying, "There is no indication that any benefit could accrue to him [the peti-
tioner] if the writ were issued, nor that he will suffer any detriment if it is denied."
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mandamus offers no remedy against established injury because it can
be used only to restrain or compel action, not to correct injury which
has already occurred.'7
Tort Actions
Public employees and officers can have their actions challenged
in tort actions commenced by an individual to recover for injuries per-
sonally suffered.'" While the administration of government is not
directly regulated by the existence of a tort cause of action available
against a public official, the possibility of such an action does have
an indirect effect on public officers by impressing upon them the dan-
gers of reproachable conduct. Nevertheless, tort remedies are insuffi-
cient to review official acts. Torts committed by officials are not
actionable if the harmful conduct is within the legal discretion of the
officer;19 if he has acted in good faith without malice under the apparent
authority of an unconstitutional, invalid, or inapplicable law;20 or if
he has instituted judicial or administrative proceedings within the scope
of his authority, even if he acted maliciously and without probable
cause. 21  Consequently, tort liability is an extremely limited means
by which the individual can exert influence on government.
Declaratory Judgments
The declaratory judgment provides yet another device by which
the individual citizen can challenge the validity of any agency regulation
on both substantive and procedural grounds. 2 However, this means of
judicial review is only available to "interested persons."" There exists
a long line of legislative precedent in California which makes it clear
that an "interested person" is one having not merely a consequential
Id. at 352, 254 P.2d at 10. Such language brings the reader no closer to an understand-
ing of what the mandate statute requires. Similar interpretations of an "interested per-
son" fail to give clarity to the meaning of this requirement. See note 23 & accompany-
ing text infra. However, where the question is one of public interest and the petitioner
seeks to procure the enforcement of a public duty by a writ of mandate, he need not
show any special interest in the result. See McDonald v. Stockton Metropolitan Transit
Dist., 36 Cal. App. 3d 436, 440, 111 Cal. Rptr. 637, 641 (1973); American Friends
Service Comm. v. Procunier, 33 Cal. App. 3d 252, 256, 109 Cal. Rptr. 22, 23-25 (1973).
17. See Sheehan v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 188 Cal. 525, 535, 206 P. 70, 75
(1922).
18. See CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 814-95.8 (West 1966 & Supp. 1976).
19. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).
20. Id. § 820.6.
21. Id. § 821.6. California law contains other exceptions to tort liability. See,
e.g., id. §§ 820.4, 821-21.4.




interest in the litigation, but a direct one.24 Therefore, for example,
a trade association whose members are subject to a particular agency
regulation but which is not subject to the regulation is not an
"interested person" within the meaning of the declaratory judgment
statute because the harm is not suffered directly by the association.25
This restriction upon the individual citizen's standing to sue reduces the
likelihood that courts in declaratory judgment suits will provide effec-
tive review of official conduct.
Owing to the weaknesses of prerogative writs, tort actions, and
declaratory judgments as tools for enforcement of public accountability,
the individual citizen must have more effective means to challenge offi-
cial action. The citizen must have access to a grievance procedure
which has the ability to redress past wrongs and to enjoin future mis-
conduct, and which does not require compliance with technical rules
of standing.
A Review of Taxpayers' Suits:
An Alternative for Controlling Official Misconduct
A promising device by which a citizen can check official mis-
conduct is the taxpayer's suit. In order to supply a means by which
the average citizen can obtain injunctive relief against public officers,
virtually all states permit these suits by statute or common law.26
A taxpayer's suit gives citizens standing to sue despite the technical
requirement of standing which must be complied with in other suits
at law or equity.27  By this requirement, a plaintiff must allege that
the challenged action has caused him sufficient injury to insure that he
has a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation and will pursue
his claim vigorously.28 It should be stressed that in a taxpayer's suit,
24. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 370, 380 (West Supp. 1976); CAL. CODE Civ.
PROC. § 387 (West 1973). This conclusion was reached in Associated Boat Indus. v.
Marshall, 104 Cal. App. 2d 21, 22, 230 P.2d 379, 380 (1951).
25. See Associated Boat Indus. v. Marshall, 104 Cal. App. 2d 21, 22, 230 P.2d
379, 380 (1951).
26. For a list of the supporting authority in each state see Taxpayers' Suits, supra
note 6 at 895-96.
27. It should be stressed that the term "taxpayer's suit" is a misnomer. While
the term is generally used, the payment of taxes is not the justification on which tax-
payers' suits rest. The basis for the suit is the illegal expenditure of funds by a public
official. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 529, 542, 476 P.2d
457, 466, 91 Cal. Rptr. 57, 66 (1970). Consequently, "citizen's suit" might be a more
appropriate label. Nevertheless, this note will conform to the traditional terminology.
28. The rule of standing generally remains obscure in California. In very few
decisions has the term actually been used. California courts seem to have adhered to
the traditional notions about standing expressed in federal cases such as Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968). For example, in one California case the court said, "One who
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the standing barrier is not overcome simply by softening the require-
ment. The standing requirement is totally abandoned when a tax-
payer sues a public official. Consequently, the taxpayer's suit is an
extraordinary procedural device.
While permitting taxpayers' suits against municipal and county
officials, California courts have been reluctant to follow the national
trend toward permitting taxpayers' suits against state officials. 9 The
reasons for the California position receive mention in a later discussion.
At this juncture, however, it is helpful to review the taxpayer's suit in
California and other jurisdictions in terms of its origin and justifica-
tions. Although much of this material has been discussed elsewhere,3"
a review will serve to give the reader a proper perspective on the role
which taxpayers' suits play in the judicial supervision of official conduct.
Taxpayers' Suits Outside California: Their Origins and Justifications
Taxpayers' suits against local officials to restrain illegal expendi-
tures in the United States were first permitted in the mid-19th cen-
tury."t  The early decisions justified their conclusions without lengthy
discussion or attention to logic. 3 2  Courts often premised their opinions
upon related developments in other areas of the law. For instance,
courts often drew analogies to the rationale behind stockholders' deriva-
invokes the judicial process does not have 'standing' if he, or those whom he properly
represents, does not have a real interest in the ultimate adjudication because the actor
has neither suffered nor is about to suffer any injury of sufficient magnitude reasonably
to assure that all of the relevant facts and issues will be adequately presented." Cal-
ifornia Water & Tel. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 253 Cal. App. 2d 16, 22-23, 61
Cal. Rptr. 618, 623 (1967). Such an expression of the rule of standing is far from
clear because the court merely substituted the obscure word "interest" for that of "stand-
ing." Other decisions do not serve to clarify either of these terms. One court said
that a "direct interest" and not merely a "consequential interest" is required. Associated
Boat Indus. v. Marshall, 104 Cal. App. 2d 21, 22, 230 P.2d 379, 380 (1951). Other
courts have referred to standing as merely the "right of relief." See, e.g., Friendly Vil-
lage Community Ass'n v. Silva & Hill Constr. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 220, 224, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 123, 125 (1973). Added uncertainty has arisen because of the exception to the
strict standing rule when a plaintiff asserts a public right. See Residents of Beverly
Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. App. 3d 117, 122-27, 109 Cal. Rptr. 724,
727-31 (1973). In such cases the court said, "[A] focus on the word 'interested' alone
is too narrow." Id. at 125, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 730. These interpretations bring us no
closer to a clarification of standing to sue because they merely define standing in terms
of other uncertain language.
29. See notes 50-54 & accompanying text infra.
20. See, e.g., Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 6.
31. Id. at 898. See also Adriance v. Mayor of New York, 1 Barb. 19 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1847).
32. See Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 6 at 898-99; Foster v. Coleman, 10
Cal. 278 (1858); Colton v. Hanchett, 13 Ill. 616 (1852); Sharpless v. Mayor of
Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 59 Am. Dec. 759 (1853).
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rive suits to support their recognition of taxpayers' standing.83 Under
the law of corporations, if directors of a private company spend cor-
porate funds while engaged in conduct beyond the scope of their au-
thority, they may be personally liable to the organization and may be
held accountable by any shareholder.34 The power of corporate offi-
cers is to be exercised solely pursuant to the corporation's chartered
purpose and for the benefit of the stockholders. 5 The comparison of
the local taxpayer to the stockholder, however, is not accurate." The
interests of taxpayers and stockholders vary greatly. The stockholder
has personal pecuniary or proprietary interests in the corporation to
protect. The taxpayer, on the other hand, sues on behalf of the gov-
ernment to insure that the laws are properly executed and to vindicate
some public right. The taxpayer does not "own" a portion of the
government as the stockholder owns a share in a corporation. The
stockholder's interest is voluntary while the taxpayer's interest arises
from residence and payment of taxes in some political subdivision. In
fact, taxpayers have been permitted to sue where expenditures sought
to be enjoined have not involved funds raised by taxation;37 thus their
reasons for suing have not necessarily stemmed from their own mone-
tary contributions as have the stockholder's. In short, the analogy to
stockholders' derivative actions provides little insight into the true
purpose of taxpayers' suits.
In addition, public officials have been compared to trustees. Just
as trustees can act only for purposes contemplated by the trust instru-
ment, a public official with power over public funds and property
can take action only when consistent with the law. Because the trustee
is liable when he oversteps his bounds, even in the absence of bad faith,
at least one court has concluded that public officials should likewise
be liable.38 The trustee analogy, however, also fails to disclose the
extremely broad scope of relief afforded by the taxpayer's suit. If a
public official is deemed a trustee of government funds and property,
the trust would most aptly be considered a "charitable trust" which
does not require the certainty of beneficiaries found in normal trusts
and has a purpose which is beneficial to the entire community. 9 Yet
33. See, e.g., Christopher v. Mayor of New York, 13 Barb. 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1852); Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. McIntyre, 100 Wis. 245, 75 N.W. 964 (1898).
34. See Burns v. Essling, 163 Minn. 57, 61, 203 N.W. 605, 606 (1925).
35. Id.
36. See Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 6, at 903.
37. See Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 279-80, 257 P. 530, 534 (1927);
Trickey v. City of Long Beach, 101 Cal. App. 2d 871, 881, 226 P.2d 694, 700 (1951).
38. Burns v. Essling, 163 Minn. 57, 61-62, 203 N.W. 605, 606-07 (1925).
39. See 7 B. WrrsN, SummARY oF CALiFoRNiA L&w Trusts § 37, at 5398 (8th
ed. 1974).
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it is the attorney general,40 not the trust beneficiaries,4 who holds the
power to supervise these trusts. Consequently, if a citizen is likened
to the beneficiary of a charitable trust, he would not have a cause of
action.
The rationales which courts employ to justify taxpayers' suits have
additional defects beyond the inaccuracies noted above. For instance,
they have masked many of the dangers incident to citizen suits. These
dangers can be easily forgotten when emphasis is placed upon justifica-
tions such as the above analogies. The potential for harrassment of
public officials and interference with public administration naturally
arises when an individual plaintiff does not need to show the personal
interest required under the normal rules of standing. California courts
have gone so far as to declare that the taxpayer's motives for seeking an
injunction are irrelevant.4" In addition, taxpayers' suits pose the threat
of a multitude of actions which could easily lead to court congestion.43
In order to answer these criticisms, the true purpose for the taxpayer's
suit must be relied upon for its justification. As one commentator has
stated:
The ultimate basis for granting standing . . . [is] outside
the normal language of the courts. Taxpayers' litigation seems
designed to enable a large body of the citizenry to challenge
governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in
the courts because of the standing requirement. Such litigation
allows the courts, within the framework of traditional notions of
"standing," to add to the controls over public officials inherent
in the elective process the judicial scrutiny of the statutory and
constitutional validity of their acts.
44
During the century which followed the first taxpayer's suit, citizens
were gradually granted standing to challenge actions of state officials in
a majority of jurisdictions which considered the problem. 45 As of 1960,
the right to sue had been upheld in at least thirty-four states. In only
two states was there a clear rejection of state taxpayer standing, while
the issue appeared unresolved in fourteen states.46  The wide acceptance
of these suits reflects the realization that there are no significant reasons
40. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12580-95 (West 1963).
41. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 863 (West 1954).
42. See, e.g., Mock v. City of Santa Rosa, 126 Cal. 330, 345, 58 P. 826, 830
(1899).
43. See Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 6, at 909-10.
44. Id. at 904.
45. Id. at 900. However, courts have been somewhat reluctant to permit taxpay-
ers' suits against state officials. Professor Davis noted that over twenty jurisdictions
require that the taxpayer show some personal interest in his suit. See DAvis, supra
note 11, §§ 22.10 (Supp. 1970). This defeats the fundamental purpose of these suits
by reimposing the initial standing requirement.
46. See Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 6, at 895.
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for distinguishing local taxpayer actions from their state counterparts.47
In other words, the real basis for recognizing a taxpayer's standing, the
necessity for prompt action to prevent irreparable harm to the public,
applies equally well where state funds are misappropriated. Local
taxpayers can maintain suits not because they have unique interests
different from those of state taxpayers, but because they have a stake in
the expenditure of public funds. The only real difference is the propor-
tion of their contributions to total government expenditure.
The United States Supreme Court noted this difference in relative
contribution in Massachusetts v. Mellon48 where it held that a taxpayer
lacked standing to sue federal officials in order to enjoin federal expend-
itures. However, the Court did not rely on this difference to deny
standing. While it is true that a taxpayer contributes proportionately
less to federal spending than he does to total state or local expenditures,
the Court in Mellon simply relied on the traditional requirements for
standing to sue in order to deny relief.49 Taxpayers' suits directed
toward any level of government should not be made to depend upon the
relative size of a taxpayer's contribution to government. Instead of
relying on the tax contribution, courts should stress the underlying
purpose of taxpayers' suits: to provide relief where there might other-
wise be none. As will be seen, the barrier in California to permitting
taxpayers' suits on the state level has not been the relative tax contribu-
tion argument. Instead, statutory interpretation has proven to be the
principal obstacle.
To summarize, while American courts employ arguments such as
the analogy to stockholder derivative suits to rationalize taxpayer stand-
ing on both the local and state levels, the justification for taxpayers' suits
lies in the recognition that without them it might be impossible to take
prompt action to prevent uncorrectable harm to the public. The dan-
gers associated with such suits are many; yet without them, a public
official may remain unaccountable to the citizenry because of the inade-
quacy of the other means by which a citizen can obtain judicial review
of official misconduct.
Taxpayers' Suits Within California: Their Origins and Justifications
As discussed previously, California has been slow to exempt tax-
payers from traditional standing requirements in suits against state
47. Id. at 902.
48. 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). This holding was overridden insofar as it was
inconsistent with the decision in a later case which granted taxpayer standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of federal expenditures under "specific" clauses of the Con-
stitution. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
49. 262 U.S. at 488.
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officers. In 1858, the California Supreme Court permitted an individu-
al taxpayer to seek injunctive relief against the acts of local government
officials. 50 Since that date, the local taxpayer has been found to be
within that category of claimants recognized to have a sufficient interest
in their claims to be able to sue without statutory authorization."' In
1906, the California Legislature codified the supreme court's 1858
position in section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, thus recogniz-
ing a statutory right to relief. The section provides:
An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any
illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or
other property of a county, town, city or city and county of the
state, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent,
or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a citizen resident
therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to
pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action,
has paid, a tax therein.
52
After the adoption of section 526a, while a majority of other states
were extending taxpayers' suits to actions against state officers, the
courts and legislature in California failed to similarly expand their
scope. The attorney general, as late as 1953, concluded that state
taxpayers' suits were impliedly prohibited by the failure of the legisla-
ture to include state officers among the list of potentially liable persons
in section 526a.5 The issue of whether a taxpayer could enjoin acts of
state officers had not been directly decided in California before the
attorney general's opinion. However, taxpayers had brought actions




In 1962 the issue of whether a taxpayer could maintain an action
against state officials to enjoin an allegedly improper expenditure was
50. See Foster v. Coleman, 10 Cal. 278 (1858). The issue of taxpayer standing
was not discussed in the case.
51. See Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 159, 496
P.2d 1248, 1254, 101 Cal. Rptr. 880, 886 (1972).
52. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 526a (West Supp. 1976). Section 526a further
provides that: "This section does not affect any right of action in favor of a county,
city, town, or city and county, or any public officer; provided, that no injunction shall
be granted restraining the offering for sale, sale, or issuance of any municipal bonds
for public improvements or public utilities.
An action brought pursuant to this section to enjoin a public improvement project
shall take special precedence over all civil matters op the calendar of the court except
those matters to which equal precedence on the calendar is granted by law." Id.
53. See 22 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 93, 96 (1953).
54. See Holloway v. Purcell, 35 Cal. 2d 220, 217 P.2d 665 (1950); Wheeler v.
Herbert, 152 Cal. 224, 92 P. 353 (1907); Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 36 P.
424 (1894).
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confronted by a California court in Ahigren v. Carr."' The plaintiffs,
as taxpayers and citizens of California, sought to enjoin John E. Carr,
State Director of Finance, from approving contracts between the state
and certain publishers for the purchase of textbooks and to enjoin Alan
Cranston, State Controller, from distributing funds for the purchase of
the books. The plaintiffs alleged that the actions of these officers would
result in the illegal expenditure of state funds. The legislature had
appropriated funds to purchase school books but had provided that the
money not be used to finance contracts in which the price of books
exceeded a specified amount. Contracts were negotiated and submitted
to the director of finance for approval. The taxpayers' action was then
commenced on the grounds that the price in the contracts exceeded the
legislature's limitation. The trial court concluded that the taxpayer had
no standing to enjoin state officials from spending state funds illegally.
The court of appeal reversed, however, citing the great weight of
authority throughout the country. The court quoted a commentator to
present its own understanding of the purpose behind taxpayer suits:
The taxpayers' suit [is] a means of vindicating individual rights
but ... [also] a governmental device to safeguard the legal re-
strictions on state and local governments, which, if not subjected
to the careful scrutiny of individual taxpayers, might as well be-
come dead letters. The importance of the latter factor is indicated
by the enactment of statutes allowing such suits in those jurisdic-
tions in which judicial interpretation of ordinary legal principles
had denied the taxpayer's status to sue. The overwhelming accept-
ance of such suits is in keeping with the distrust of executive and
administrative self-restraint in the use of the spending power and
with the readiness to allow the courts to assume the role of arbiter
in the governmental scheme.5 6
The Ahigren decision rejected the argument that an action against
officers of the state in their official capacity is a suit against the state
itself to which it has not consented. 57  The court concluded that an
action against state officers to enjoin their illegal actions or to obtain
relief from an invalid action or abuse of authority is ordinarily not a suit
against the state and therefore not prohibited under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.58
While the decision in Ahigren appeared to break new ground, the
court of appeal might have sustained the action on grounds consistent
with the intent of the legislature, which apparently was to exclude state
officers from the statutory scheme of section 526a of the Code of Civil
55. 209 Cal. App. 2d 248, 25 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1962).
56. Id. at 253, 25 Cal. Rptr. 889-90, quoting Note, Taxpayers' Suits as a Means
of Controlling the Expenditure of Public Funds, 50 HARv. L. REv. 1276, 1283-84
(1937).
57. 209 Cal. App. 2d at 255, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
58. Id.
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Procedure." The court did not cite the section and thus failed to
reconcile its decision with existing statutory authority. The statute,
however, not only permits suits against officers of "a county, town, city
or city and county" but also against "any agent, or other person, acting
in its behalf." 60 The factual situation of Ahlgren could be construed to
support a contention that the director of finance and the state controller
were acting to the benefit or on "behalf" of local school districts which
the California Constitution requires to be furnished with textbooks by
the state.6 Section 526a, of course, does not expressly extend liability
to officers of local school districts. However, prior to Ahlgren, the
California Supreme Court in Gogerty v. Coachella Valley Junior College
District recognized, without reference to section 526a, that a taxpayer
could bring suit against a junior college district board of trustees.62 If a
local taxpayer may successfully enjoin acts by junior college district
officers, he should be able to sue officers of local school districts. If the
court in Ahlgren had viewed the state officials as acting on behalf of
these districts, the court would not have had to recognize state taxpayer
standing in all suits against state officers contrary to the apparent
legislative intent embodied in section 526a.63
Eight years after Ahlgren v. Carr, the issue of a taxpayer's standing
to sue state officers was again raised in the court of appeal in California
State Employees' Association v. Williams,64 a suit against the adminis-
trator of the Medi-Cal program and the state controller. The plaintiffs,
two taxpayers and the California State Employees' Association, alleged
that statutes and a contract calling for private companies to administer
the Medi-Cal program violated the civil service amendment to the
California Constitution.65 The court merely cited the Ahlgren decision
with approval in recognizing taxpayers' standing to enjoin illegal state
expenditures.66 Nevertheless, the issue of whether a taxpayer could sue
a state officer was not critical to the decision, because the association
was itself a "beneficially interested" person which could restrain an
officer within the meaning of the mandate statute.6 7
59. See 22 Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 93, 96 (1953).
60. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 526a (West 1976).
61. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
62. 57 Cal. 2d 727, 730, 371 P.2d 582, 584, 21 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (1962).
63. Such a suit against a state official was permitted by a case in New York.
Olmsted v. Meahl, 219 N.Y. 270, 114 N.E. 393 (1916). The court held that a tax-
payer's action may be maintained against state officers under a statute authorizing tax-
payers' actions against persons acting for or on behalf of any local government.
64. 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
65. CAL. CONST. art. XXIV.
66. 7 Cal. App. 3d at 395, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
67. CAL. CODE CMy. PROC. § 1085 (West 1955).
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The Issue Reaches the California Supreme Court
Not until 1971, in the case of Blair v. Pitchess68 did the California
Supreme Court make reference to taxpayers' standing to sue state offi-
cials. Blair was not a suit against state officers, but was a taxpayer's
suit against the Los Angeles County Sheriff to enjoin the spending of
funds by him to enforce an unconstitutional statute. The supreme court
merely noted the decisions in AhIgren and Williams without placing its
weight behind the decisions. 9 Although this case fell squarely under
section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure because Pitchess was a
county officer, the court stated:
[W]e have not limited suits under section 526a to challenges of
policies or ordinances adopted by the county, city or town. If
county, town or city officials implement a state statute or even the
provisions of the state Constitution, an injunction under section
526a will issue to restrain such enforcement if the provision is
unconstitutional.... Indeed, it has been held that taxpayers may
sue state officials to enjoin such officials from illegally expending
state funds30
The above quotations from Blair v. Pitchess leads to speculation
that the court viewed state taxpayers' suits as authorized by section
526a, given the introductory sentence ("[W]e have not limited suits
under section 526a to challenges of policies or ordinances") and the
discussion of state taxpayers' standing which followed. The court did
stress that California courts consistently have construed section 526a
liberally to achieve the remedial purpose of the section. This primary
purpose, the court said, was to "enable a large body of the citizenry to
challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged
in the courts because of the standing requirement." 71 Surely such
reasoning underlies the justification for state taxpayers' suits as well as
local taxpayers' actions. Liberally construed, section 526a could be
understood to encompass taxpayers' suits to enjoin acts by state officials.
As noted before,72 state officers may be sued as agents of a local
government when they have acted on its behalf.
A Statutory Basis for State Taxpayers' Suits
After Blair v, Pitchess, a possibility remained that the California
Supreme Court would limit taxpayers' standing against state officials to
the statutory language of section 526a. Although the AhIgren v. Carr"
68. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
69. Id. at 268, 486 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 267-68, 486 P.2d at 1248-49, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49, quoting Taxpayers'
Suits, supra note 6, at 904.
72. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
73. 209 Cal. App. 2d 248, 25 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1962).
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decision was written in broad terms and suggested that courts recognize
state taxpayers' suits when statewide considerations are present, there
was reason for caution. No subsequent supreme court opinion had
expressly approved Ahigren. Further, the decision was susceptible to a
narrow interpretation given the facts of the case. Lastly, the California
Attorney General had previously interpreted section 526a to contain an
implied prohibition of taxpayers' suits against state officers. Conse-
quently, the line of cases from Ahigren to Blair do not resolve the
question of whether a taxpayer may enjoin illegal and wasteful acts by
state officers.
Added reason for caution in broadly interpreting AhIgren and
succeeding decisions came in 1971 in the well-known school finan-
cing case, Serrano v. Priest.4 Justice Sullivan, who also wrote the
Blair v. Pitchdss opinion, suggested in Serrano the possibility that the
supreme court would narrowly construe the Ahigren decision in the
future. Serrano v. Priest was a taxpayers' suit against both local and
state officials to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiff tax-
payers and school children alleged that the public school system in Cali-
fornia was maintained by a financing scheme that relied heavily on the
local property tax, which caused substantial disparity among individual
school districts in the amount of revenue available per pupil. The
plaintiffs therefore alleged that they had to pay a higher tax rate than
the taxpayers in other districts to obtain the same or fewer educational
opportunities for their children. Such a system, they claimed, was vio-
lative of the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution and the California Constitution.7 5 The
supreme court held the financing scheme unconstitutional and, there-
fore, concluded that the taxpayers had clearly stated a cause of action.
More specifically, the opinion, citing Blair v. Pitchess and section 526a,
declared that county officers may be enjoined from spending time
implementing the financing scheme.76 However, the decision did not
resolve the issue of plaintiffs' standing against the defendant state offi-
cers. The court relegated the question to a footnote: "Although plain-
tiff parents bring this action against state, as well as county officials,
it has been held that state officers too may be sued under section
526a." The court merely cited the Ahigren, Williams and Blair
decisions as authority for this statement. Yet neither Ahlgren78 nor
Williams79 referred to section 526a, while the Blair v. Pitchess decision
74. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
75. Id. at 590-91, 487 P.2d at 1244-45, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05.
76. Id. at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265-66, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26.
77. Id. at 618 n.38, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
78. 209 Cal. App. 2d 248, 25 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1962).
79. 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
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merely alluded in dicta that section 526a authorizes taxpayers' suits
against state officers.8 ° Consequently, this footnote gave reason to pre-
sume that the supreme court in the future would view a taxpayer's
standing to enjoin state officials in terms of section 526a and would
limit such suits to instances in which state officers had acted on behalf
of local governments.
Consider that in Serrano the defendants were enjoined from
spending local, not state, funds. Section 526a could have been applied
directly to the facts because local funds were alleged to have been
illegally spent by officials of a county and by state officers who could
be said to have been "acting on its behalf." Any directives given by
a state official regarding the expenditure of these local funds therefore
could have been attempts to maintain or advance the quality of educa-
tion offered students by local schools, which could have been construed,
in turn, to have been in the interests of the school districts. In short,
the court could have concluded that by advancing local interests, the
state officers acted on behalf of the county within the meaning of sec-
tion 526a. Such an interpretation of the facts in Serrano v. Priest would
have permitted the court to recognize the taxpayers' standing in this
particular case without any expansion of taxpayers' suits along the
general lines of AhIgren and Williams. Instead of discussing these
decisions and rejecting or accepting taxpayers' standing, the court could
have said that a review of those decisions was unnecessary given their
limited factual situations. However, the court took a third avenue and
placed the California law regarding these suits in question. Within the
one sentence footnote, the court appears to have viewed the Ahigren
decision and its own comment in Blair8l as being based on section 526a
jurisdiction rather than on a broad common law exemption to the stand-
ing requirement. As noted before,82 AhIgren, which never referred
to section 526a, could have been decided within the scope of that
section. The question remaining after Serrano was whether the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court construed the seemingly all-encompassing
AhIgren decision as permitting taxpayers' suits against state officers
only when they were acting on behalf of local governments. Ahlgren
and Williams, on their face, as well as cases from many other American
jurisdictions, 83 would support the expansion of taxpayers' standing to
all suits against state officers. However, the Serrano footnote appears
to have been a calculated attempt to link the permissible range of tax-
payers' suits to the limited scope of section 526a of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
80. See notes 68-72 & accompanying text supra.
81. Id.
82. See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
83. See notes 45-46 & accompanying text supra.
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The Law of Taxpayers' Suits Is Clarified
In June 1976, the law regarding taxpayers' suits on the state level
was clarified by the California Supreme Court in Stanson v. Mott.8 4 In
1974, California voters approved a bond to provide funds for the pur-
chase of recreational lands. On the day before the election, Stanson
filed a taxpayer's suit alleging that the defendant William Mott, Jr.,
director of the California Department of Parks and Recreation, had
illegally expended more than $5,000 to promote passage of the bond.
While Stanson did not seek to enjoin future illegal expenditures, he
sought to hold Mott personally liable to repay the funds to the state.
Mott demurred, arguing that the expenditures were proper and that in
any event, he could not be held personally liable for them. The trial
court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment for Mott. Stanson
appealed, and the supreme court in a unanimous decision reversed.
Justice Tobriner, writing for the court, indicated that it was
possible for a taxpayer to enjoin Mott from illegally spending state
funds.8 5 In doing so, Tobriner referred to the Ahigren decision and
section 526a. However, because this was not a suit for injunctive
relief, the discussion of Ahlgren and the section was only dicta.
Justice Tobriner wrote:
The complaint alleges, inter alia, that defendant Mott . . . sanc-
tioned the distribution, at public expense, of promotional materials
written by a private organization formed to promote the passage
of the bond act .... [If Stanson] establishes that similar expenses
are threatened in the future, he will also be entitled to injunctive
relief.86
The factual situation of Stanson indicates that the supreme court
adopted the broad view of state taxpayers' suits that was advocated in
Ahlgren. The facts and the above quoted passage imply that a tax-
payer may enjoin a state officer whenever state funds have been spent
illegally. Mott was a state officer, who spent state funds with the
alleged purpose of promoting a statewide bond issue. Clearly, he
cannot be said to have been acting on behalf of a county or city gov-
ernment. Consequently, the narrow scope of section 526a, which
allows a state officer to be enjoined only as an agent of a local govern-
ment, was insufficient to permit Stanson to enjoin Mott.
Although the Stanson decision justified the conclusion that the
supreme court will broadly permit taxpayers' suits on the state level,
the court again tied state taxpayers' suits to section 526a as it did in
Serrano v. Priest8 7 and Blair v. Pitchess.88  Because a suit to enjoin
84. 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
85. Id. at 222-23, 551 P.2d at 12-13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
86. Id.
87. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 618 n.38, 487 P.2d 1241, 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 626 (1971).
88. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 268, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 49 (1971).
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Mott would not be possible by the express terms of section 526a, how-
ever, one might conclude that the court now reads the term "state" into
the list of public entities whose officers may be sued under the section.
Alternatively, the reference to section 526a may imply that the court
will refer to it as the basis for an analogy in order to justify suits on
the state level.
The Implications of Applying Section 526a
to State Taxpayers' Suits
The parallels between suits on the state level and local suits under
section 526a, which have already been discussed,8 9 suggest that they
should develop in a similar manner. Given that no separate body of
law delineating state taxpayers' suits has had an opportunity to develop,
California courts will no doubt rely upon the nearly seventy years of
precedent behind section 526a to refine state taxpayers' suits. A
review of these cases will point out the liberal application courts should
permit of the rule of state taxpayer standing, the potential dangers asso-
ciated with state taxpayers' suits, the fact that merely wasteful expendi-
tures may be enjoined, and the extension of taxpayer standing to suits
to recover money illegally expended.
The Liberal Construction of Section 526a and State Taxpayers' Suits
California courts have construed section 526a liberally to achieve
its underlying purpose: a judicial remedy for official misconduct where
there would otherwise be none.90 In several cases courts have modi-
fied the express language of the section. As previously noted,91
Gogerty v. Coachella Valley Junior College District92 in effect placed
local junior college district boards of trustees within the list, although
it did not refer to section 526a explicitly, the supreme court in Irwin
v. City of Manhattan Beach93 went so far as to extend the application
of section 526a to actions brought by nonresident taxpayers, a contra-
diction, which the court acknowledged,94 to the statutory requirement
that the taxpayer plaintiff be a "citizen resident." 95  These modifica-
tions of section 526a demonstrate that courts could similarly construe
section 526a to include the term "state" within the list of local govern-
ment units whose property and funds are subjects of taxpayers' suits.
89. See notes 45-47 accompanying text supra.
90. See Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 6, at 904.
91. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
92. 57 Cal. 2d 727, 730, 371 P.2d 582, 584, 21 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (1962).
93. 65 Cal. 2d 13, 415 P.2d 769, 51 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
94. Id. at 18-20, 415 P.2d at 772-73, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
95. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 526a (West Supp. 1976).
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The Degree of Harm Necessary Before a State Official Can Be Enjoined
Judging from the body of case law that has already developed
around section 526a, it would appear that in future suits against state
officers the degree of harm to state property and funds will not be
critical to the issue of standing. In Wirin v. Parker,9 the supreme
court upheld an injunction against a local official declaring that "[iut
is immaterial that the amount of the illegal expenditures is small or that
the illegal procedures actually permit a saving of tax funds. '9 7  The
unlawfully spent funds do not even have to come from tax revenue.
They may be derived from the operation of a public utility, for
example. If money belonging to a governmental agency is illegally
expended by its officers, the inevitable result will be detriment to the
taxpayer whose burden of taxation will directly or indirectly increase.9"
Even the mere expenditure of the time of a public employee in per-
forming illegal and unauthorized acts constitutes an unlawful use of
funds which can be enjoined under section 526a.9 9 Consequently, any
state administrative action or decision can be questioned and the
validity of any legislative act that calls for some type of administrative
action can be tested. Policy decisions may be questioned even before
they are carried into action, since all decisionmaking involves the time
of a public employee. A public contract can also be terminated as a
result of an injunction to prevent the payment of money if the contract
is illegal, although the injunction might result in the abandonment of
the project contemplated by the contract as well as in subsequent business
losses to the contractor.
100
By judicially determining that the work time of public employees
is within "the estate, funds, and other property"''1 of a governmental
unit, the court has provided the equivalent to the writ of mandate inso-
far as both the writ and the taxpayer's injunction may be used to pre-
vent an officer from performing virtually any illegal act. However, a
taxpayer's suit provides the equivalent remedy without the "beneficial
interest" requirement of mandate. 102 Consequently, a taxpayer's suit
96. 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313 P.2d 844 (1957).
97, Id. at 894, 313 P.2d at 846.
98. See Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 279-80, 257 P. 530, 534 (1927);
Trickey v. City of Long Beach, 101 Cal. App. 2d 871, 881, 226 P.2d 694, 700 (1951).
99. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 269, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 49 (1971); Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 504-05, 193 P.2d 470, 474
(1948).
100. See Crowe v. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117, 121, 193 P. 111, 112 (1920).
101. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 526a (West Supp. 1976).
102. A petitioner for a writ of mandate must show that he is "beneficially" inter-
ested in his suit. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1086 (West 1955). In one case, however,
it was held that a petitioner did not need to show a special interest because it was
sufficient that he had an interest as a citizen in having laws executed when seeking
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may provide a remedy when a writ of mandate is unobtainable. For
example, the California Code of Civil Procedure permits a writ of man-
date to be issued to inquire into the validity of administrative decisions
made as a result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is re-
quired. s03 However, to obtain the writ in such a situation, the peti-
tioner must have a personal interest in the proceeding. Taxpayers'
suits would permit any citizen to review such a decision without show-
ing such an interest because a hearing requires the expenditure of a
hearing officer's time. If an erroneous decision was made, a wasteful
or illegal expenditure of time was also made. In a similar manner, the
taxpayer's suit avoids the statutory requirement of a personal interest
to obtain declaratory relief when testing the validity of an agency's
regulation"' because rulemaking, like decisionmaking, involves the
expenditure of time of a public official.
The Potential for Abuse of Taxpayer Standing
One of the primary objections to giving taxpayers standing to
enjoin expenditures by public officials has been the potential for
abuse.' 05 The courts could be flooded with suits intended to harass
public officials and to deter their implementation of policies to which
the taxpayer is opposed. Such expanded litigation could easily result
given the prevailing liberal interpretation of the applicability of section
526a. For example, the California court of appeal in City of Ceres
v. City of Modesto'"6 pointed out that even though a court should not
take cognizance of political disputes where a taxpayer is not in agree-
ment with the government's policy, it said that a court will not close
its eyes to expenditures enjoinable under section 526a. 0 7 Ceres
involved an action brought by a Modesto taxpayer and the City of Ceres
for injunctive relief against the City of Modesto to prevent the proposed
extension of sewer lines into an unincorporated area adjoining the City
of Modesto. The court held that such an action by officials was review-
able under section 526a. While Modesto's plan was permissible under
the California Constitution,'0 " the injunction was granted on the grounds
that if the plan were carried out it would represent a waste of city funds,
since Modesto could never annex this particular area and the City of
to enforce a public duty. Board of Social Welf. v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.
2d 98, 100-01, 162 P.2d 627, 628-29 (1945). See also Diaz v. Quitoriano, 268 Cal.
App. 2d 807, 811, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358, 362 (1969).
103. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 1094.5 (West Supp. 1976).
104. CAL. Gov':r CODE § 11440 (West 1966).
105. See Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 6, at 909.
106. 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 79 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969).
107. Id. at 555, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
108. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 19.
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Ceres, which could annex the land, could construct similar lines for half
the cost.
In addition to Ceres, at least one other opinion suggests that a
court will not question ulterior motives of a taxpayer-plaintiff and will
not disqualify him on the basis of some personal or political interest
in his suit.' With the extension of taxpayers' suits to actions against
state officials, the courts will become forums for political views so long
as judges grant standing solely on the basis of the illegality of an
expenditure. Political goals will be an impetus to bringing these suits
as a means of altering government policies.
Enjoining Wasteful Expenditures by State Officials
The danger of such vexatious litigation which may result from an
expansion of the scope of section 526a to include state officials appears
more evident upon further consideration of the language of the statute.
Not only are illegal expenditures or uses of property enjoinable under
section 526a, but wasteful activities, not unlawful in themselves, may
also be prevented. Consequently, a taxpayer who wishes to annoy an
official or to challenge political decisions may file suit without alleging
an illegal act.
Waste is, obviously, a nebulous concept lacking the specificity
associated with an illegal act which has at least a statutory description
or a common law meaning. The court of appeal in City of Ceres v.
City of Modesto'" recognized the problems associated with such an
imprecise term and attempted to define waste narrowly to avoid
constant harrassment of officials that "could seriously hamper our
representative form of government at the local level." ' The court
said that "waste" as used in section 526a means "something more than
an alleged mistake by public officials in matters involving the exercise
of judgment or wide discretion.""' 2
Harnett v. County of Sacramento"3 involved another example of
an enjoinable wasteful expenditure. In Harnett, the supreme court
upheld an injunction against an election concerning a redistricting
ordinance on grounds that the ordinance would not have accomplished
the desired redistricting even if it were approved by a majority of the
voters. If taxpayers could prevent actions of state officials under the
precedents behind section 526a, elections of this type could be enjoin-
able on the state level.
109. See Mock v. City of Santa Rosa, 126 Cal. 330, 345, 58 P. 826, 830 (1899).
110. 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 555, 79 Cal. Rptr. 168, 173 (1969).
111. Id. at 555, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
112. Id.
113. 195 Cal. 676, 235 P. 445 (1925).
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The "more than a mistake" standard for enjoining wasteful acts
that was expressed in City of Ceres v. City of Modesto" 4 suggests that
abuse of discretion is the test for the reviewability of a wasteful action.
Consequently, another requirement for a writ of mandate can be
avoided by pressing a taxpayer's suit. The writ of mandate is only
available to compel a public official to perform a ministerial public duty
or to exercise his discretion when he refuses to act. 1" 5 Discretionary acts
themselves, except for decisions in agency adjudications," 6 are beyond
the reach of the writ. However, if a taxpayer may challenge a wasteful
act "in matters involving the exercise of judgment or wide discre-
tion,""17 he is able to question the exercise of discretion itself when
a decision or action involves waste.
In summary, courts will no doubt permit state taxpayers' suits to
enjoin wasteful as well as illegal expenditures given the supreme court's
repeated references to section 526a. Such an extension is also prob-
able in light of the liberal construction given to taxpayer standing to
sue under that section. However, the precedent behind section 526a
poses dangers which may plague the courts when state taxpayers' suits
are brought before them. The motives for bringing suit may not be
questioned under present case law, thus presenting the possibility for
vexatious litigation. However, the precedent behind section 526a has
even greater consequence for suits on the state level as the following
section will point out.
Taypayers' Suits To Hold State Officials Personally Liable for Their
Public Wrongs
The most far-reaching implication of permitting taxpayers' suits to
enjoin expenditures by state officers is that such an extension sets the
stage for courts to recognize the right of a taxpayer to hold a state offi-
cer personally liable for revenues wastefully or illegally spent. The
California Supreme Court in Stanson v. Mott has recently made this
extension.118 This section of the note will discuss pre-Stanson prece-
dent for personal liability as well as the Stanson decision itself. In
addition, related legal developments from other jurisdictions will
receive mention where applicable.
114. 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 555, 79 Cal. Rptr. 168, 173 (1969). See text accom-
panying note 112 supra.
115. See DAvis, supra note 11, at 398.
116. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1094.5 (West Supp. 1976).
117. City of Ceres v. City of Modesto, 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 555, 79 Cal. Rptr.
168, 173 (1969).
118. 17 Cal. 3d 206, 210, 551 P.2d 1, 4, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1976).
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The California Precedent
Only six years after the enactment of section 526a, the California
Supreme Court, in Osburn v. Stone," 9 extended the scope of taxpayers'
suits to permit legal as well as equitable relief against public officers.
In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, while acting as
mayor and city councilmen of Santa Cruz, made illegal expenditures.
The plaintiff sought to compel the defendants to pay the city the sum
illegally spent. The supreme court determined that section 526a, while
authorizing injunctive relief, did not forbid a taxpayer from seeking to
recover on behalf of his municipality funds illegally expended. 2 ' The
court rationalized the extension as follows:
[I]t seems quite plain that the necessity to a municipality, whose
affairs are in the hands of hostile trustees or councilmen, to recover
for illegal expenditures, through the medium of such an action,
is quite as great and as imperative as it is in the case of private
corporations, and as a stockholder of the latter would have on be-
half of his corporation, upon the refusal of its directors to act,
the right to maintain such an action, so we think should a tax-
payer in the case of a municipality be accorded the same right
and power. 12'
The court proceeded to reject the trial court's conclusion that such suits
would mean that local government would have difficulty inducing "good
and responsible men" to serve in office. The court recognized that
there is some truth in the trial court's assertion, but felt that the powers
of municipal officers are well defined, that the officers are given legal
advice by law or are empowered to obtain it, and that there is no reason
for them to make illegal expenditures. 22
As recently as 1972, the California Supreme Court affirmed the
ability of a taxpayer to hold a public official personally liable for illegal
expenditures. In the case of Harmon v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco,'2 3 a taxpayer sought to invalidate the method by which the city
obtained appraisals of property that it sold or agreed to sell. The plain-
tiff also sought damages for the city equal to the difference between
the value and sale price of the land conveyed. The court recognized
that a plaintiff-taxpayer seeking to avoid the waste of municipal assets
has a sufficient interest in his claim to establish his standing to sue,
since any wasteful or illegal expenditure may indirectly increase his tax
burden in meeting government's expenses.' The court went on to
state that:
119. 170 Cal. 480, 150 P. 367 (1915). See also Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal.
273, 257 P. 530 (1927).
120. 170 Cal. at 482, 150 P. at 368.
121. Id. at 482-83, 150 P. at 368.
122. Id. at 484, 150 P. at 369.
123. 7 Cal. 3d 150, 496 P.2d 1248, 101 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1972).
124. Id. at 159-60, 496 P.2d at 1254, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
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In recognition of this interest, the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that any taxpayer of one year's standing may bring an
"action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any Me-
gal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to" the assets of his muni-
cipality. ... If plaintiff in the instant case sought merely to ob-
tain injunctive relief, this provision would suffice to establish her
standing. Because plaintiff also seeks to obtain damages in behalf
of the city, however, her interest in the outcome does not diminish.
Accordingly, plaintiff's interest as a taxpayer in the outcome of
the instant case establishes her standing to seek both equitable
and legal relief against the city's allegedly wrongful disposition of
its assets.'
25
Because state taxpayers are now considered to have standing to enjoin
actions by state officials, the identical argument can be made in support
of suits for damages..
The extension of taxpayers' suits to actions for damages against
state officers was recently made in Stanson v. Mott,'"26 which was pre-
viously cited for its clarification of the ability of a taxpayer to obtain
injunctive relief against state officers. 27  While the issue of injunctive
relief was discussed only in dicta, the question of a state officer's per-
sonal liability for damages was central to the decision. Much of the
supreme court's opinion was devoted to the question whether Mott's
expenditures of state funds during the campaign over the bond issue
were proper. However, the final discussion focused on the situations
in which a taxpayer might hold a state officer personally liable.
The plaintiff in Stanson relied upon the authority of Mines v. Del
Valle 2 8 to support his position that a state officer could be held strictly
liable for improper expenditures in a taxpayer's suit.'29  In Mines, also
a taxpayer's suit, the supreme court determined that expenditures to
promote the passage of a bond issue by the Los Angeles Board of Pub-
lic Service Commissioners were improper. 30 The court held that the
commissioners were strictly liable for the funds spent, rejecting the
defendants' argument that they should escape liability because they had
spent the funds in the good faith belief that their actions were author-
ized by law.' 8 ' While accepting Mines for the proposition that a tax-
payer could hold an officer, state or local, personally liable, the court
in Stanson rejected the strict liability standard of that case as no longer
sound.'1 2
125. Id. at 160, 496 P.2d at 1254, 101 Cal.Rptr. at 886.
126. 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
127. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
128. 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927).
129. 17 Cal. 3d at 223, 551 P.2d at 13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at709.
130. 201 Cal. 273, 288, 257 P. 530, 537 (1927).
131. Id. at 288-89, 257 P. at 537-38.
132. 17 Cal. 3d at 223, 551 P.2d at 13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
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Until Stanson v. Mott was decided in June 1976, taxpayers' stand-
ing to hold public officials liable for funds illegally spent had been an
extremely powerful tool by which individual officers were held to a high
degree of accountability because of the strict liability standard. In the
prior cases of Osburn v. Stone'33 and Mines v. Del Valle, 34 the
supreme court had relied upon the assumption that "[tihere is no
reason for . . . ever making any illegal expenditure of the public's
monies."' 35  The court decided in Mines that public officers were
vested with certain discretion in the execution of their duties and they
could not be held responsible for honest, albeit mistaken, exercises of
their discretionary powers. However, an officer was not justified in
exceeding the authority expressly or impliedly given to him by law, no
matter how honest his intentions.'3 6 Thus, in the case of Mahoney v.
City & County of San Francisco'31 which employed the Mines rule,
there was no question of the officers' good faith, but since they had
expended and audited money under a contract which was illegal, the
officers were liable to repay the expenditures. Since any illegal pay-
ment exceeds an officer's power, all such acts were deemed to subject
an official to a duty to restore the same to the public treasury. Hence,
in a taxpayer's suit there was strict liability which served as a compelling
reminder to government officers of the illegal constraints and the
limited scope of their authority.
Nonetheless, the assumptions that the limits of authorized public
expenditures are always clearly ascertainable and that there is no
excuse for an officer to innocently exceed these limitations were
rejected in Stanson v. Mott'3 8 as "unrealistic" and as incompatible with
legislation enacted subsequent to the early decisions.' 9 The court
declared:
In our view, the Mines approach imposes an overly harsh sanction
on well-motivated public officials, and will often work to the detri-
ment of the public interest by deterring such officials from under-
taking such activities as the dissemination of useful information
to the public.' 40
While no statutes were directly in point, the court cited the Cali-
fornia Tort Claims Act of 1963141 under which a public employee must
bear the ultimate financial burden for his actions in cases of "fraud,
133. 170 Cal. 480, 150 P. 367 (1915).
134. 201 Cal. at 288, 257 P. at 237.
135. 170 Cal. at 484, 150 P. at 369.
136. 201 Cal. at 289, 257 P. at 538.
137. 201 Cal. 248, 257 P. 49 (1927).
138. 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
139. Id. at 224, 551 P.2d at 13-14, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10.
140. Id. at 226, 551 P.2d at 15, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
141. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966 & Supp. 1976).
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corruption, or malice.' 1 42  Clearly, an official who spends funds under
similar circumstances is liable. However, the court in Stanson deemed
that officers should be held to a higher standard of conduct than merely
the avoidance of "fraud, corruption, and actual malice.' 143 Justice
Tobriner wrote:
We conclude instead that such public officials must use "due care,"
i.e., reasonable diligence, in authorizing the expenditure of public
funds, and may be subject to personal liability for improper expend-
itures made in the absence of such due care.'
44
The court gave further guidance regarding the circumstances in which
an official might be held liable by listing several considerations relevant
to such a determination. These included
whether the expenditure's impropriety was obvious or not, whether
the official was alerted to the possible invalidity of the expenditure,
[and] whether the official relied upon legal advice or on the pre-
sumed validity of an existing legislative enactment or judicial
decision in making the expenditure.
145
The Stanson standard appears to be a much more realistic criterion
for personal responsibility than strict liability. Mistakes made honestly
and in good faith should not subject an official to personal liability.
The public official should be likened to the lawyer, doctor, or other
professional who is not liable for errors of judgement.146 By employ-
ing a "due care" standard, courts will eventually develop a body of case
law analogous to that concerning professional malpractice. Conse-
quently, "public malpractice" would seem to be an appropriate label
for the judicial authority by which public officials may be held person-
ally liable. While the attorney general has always had the ability to
enforce state claims against officers for illegal expenditures, he may fail
to carry out his duty for political or other reasons, given the discretion-
ary power incident to his office. In light of this potential failure to
prosecute, the individual citizen should have the ability to obtain relief
against those state officers who represent his interests, just as he is able
to press a claim against professionals hired to act on his behalf. Such
taxpayer-citizen standing offers a means of holding public officers
accountable to those they serve. Where there is an army of potential
taxpayer litigants, public officials may be more inclined to familiarize
themselves with the legal parameters within which they are authorized
to act.
142. 17 Cal. 3d at 225, 551 P.2d at 14, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 710, quoting Johnson
v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 792, 447 P.2d 352, 359, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 247 (1968).
143. 17 Cal. at 226, 551 P.2d at 15, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
144. Id. at 226-27, 551 P.2d at 15, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
145. Id. at 227, 551 P.2d at 15-16, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12 (citations omitted).
146. See, e.g., Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 475, 234 P.2d 34, 40 (1951).
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A Review of Taxpayers' Standing To Hold Public Officers Personally Liable
in the United States
The enlargement of the scope of taxpayer actions to include suits
for legal or restitutional relief is not unique to California. A review
of cases in other states will be helpful to illustrate the larger context
in which the Stanson v. Mott decision stands. Consequently, the law
in other jurisdictions will be discussed to ascertain the significance of
California law in the overall development of taxpayers' suits.
Cases in at least sixteen other states recognize that a taxpayer may
sue an official for damages or for the restitution of misspent funds on
behalf of the government,'47 while this author could find authority in
only four states rejecting such relief.14 8  Most of the cases permitting
taxpayer actions at law or for restitution were brought against members
of city councils, boards of county supervisors, and school boards, as well
as mayors, city treasurers, and city controllers. One of the earliest of
these cases, Russell v. Tate,'49 rejected the contention that the courfs
power was limited to equitable restraint of official acts, which the court
labeled a "reproach to justice."' ° In that case, an illegal appropriation
was made, a warrant was drawn, and the money was disbursed by the
treasurer-all within a few hours. The court noted that an attorney
could not have comprehended the situation and filed a complaint in
time to prevent the action. 5' Consequently, the court concluded that
more than injunctive relief was necessary to achieve a just result.'52 To
restrict taxpayers' actions to injunctive relief could thus defeat their
147. See Griffin v. Drennen, 145 Ala. 128, 40 So. 1016 (1905); Russell v. Tate,
52 Ark. 541, 13 S.W. 130 (1890); White v. Crandon, 116 Fla. 162, 156 So. 303 (1934);
Wester v. Belote, 103 Fla. 976, 138 So. 721 (1931); Richter v. Mayor & Aldermen,
160 Ga. 178, 127 S.E. 739 (1925); Independent School Dist. No. 5 v. Collins, 15 Ida.
535, 98 P. 857 (1908); Miller v. Jackson Township, 178 Ind. 503, 99 N.E. 102 (1912);
Kimble v. Board of Comm'rs, 32 Ind. App. 377, 66 N.E. 1023 (1903); Blume v. Craw-
ford County, 297 Iowa 545, 250 N.W. 733 (1933); Tritchler v. Bergeson, 185 Minn.
414, 241 N.W. 578 (1932); Fulk v. School Dist. No. 8, 155 Neb. 630, 53 N.W.2d 56
(1952); Brown v. Walker, 188 N.C. 52, 123 S.E. 633 (1924); Walker v. Village of
Dillonvale, 82 Ohio 137, 92 N.E. 220 (1910); Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Ore. App. 542,
502 P.2d 1385 (1972); Dale v. School Dist. No. 9, 66 S.D. 346, 283 N.W. 158 (1938);
State v. Stickle, 11 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Johnson v. Black, 103 Va. 477,
49 S.E. 633 (1905); Neacy v. Drew, 176 Wis. 348, 187 N.W. 218 (1922); Webster
v. Douglas County, 120 Wis. 181, 77 N.W. 885 (1899).
148. Clark v. George, 118 Kan. 667, 236 P. 643 (1925); Eaton v. Thayer, 124
Me. 311, 128 A. 475 (1925); Fuller v. Trustees of Deerfield Academy, 252 Mass. 258,
147 N.E. 878 (1925); Klauder v. Cox, 295 Pa. 323, 145 A. 290 (1929).
149. 52 Ark. 541, 13 S.W. 130 (1890).
150. Id. at 546, 13 S.W. at 132.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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primary aim, that of providing a remedy where none would otherwise
exist.
15 8
Ritcher v. Mayor'" presents a similar justification for permitting
taxpayers to sue officials for damages. In that case, the city council
of Savannah rescinded an illegal appropriation after a suit to enjoin it
had been commenced. As a result the case was dismissed on grounds
that the issue had become moot. However, several months later the
council reappropriated the funds, executed warrants, and had the funds
transferred thus preventing the plaintiff from reinstating his suit in time
to prevent the expenditure. The court recognized the subterfuge and
overruled demurrers to the complaint. Personal liability was assessed
to prevent the council members from avoiding the purpose of injunctive
actions.
As the Russell and Richter cases indicate, courts have based the
award of damages in taxpayers' suits on equitable principles. Courts
have also justified these decisions, as they have done in taxpayers' suits
for injunctive relief, by analogizing -them to shareholder derivative suits.
The Indiana Court of Appeals in 1903 pointed out that just as stock-
holders derivatively may hold corporate officers liable, taxpayers should
likewise be able to call public officials to account for illegally spent
funds.' " However, support for rewarding damages in taxpayers' suits
is not restricted to the common law. Taxpayers have also obtained
damages on behalf of the government based on statutory provisions that
grant standing.
156
The cases which have opposed the extension of taxpayers' suits
have done so on grounds that no statutory authority exists for such
suits; l r7 that legislative immunity prevents city councilmen from being
liable;' s that the actions resulting in loss of funds were made in good
faith;' that the court is concerned about interference with governmen-
tal operation; 60 or that the duty to press such actions is vested in a
153. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 267-69, 486 P.2d 1242, 1248-50, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 48-50 (1971).
154. 160 Ga. 178, 127 S.E. 739 (1925).
155. See Kimble v. Board of Comm'rs, 32 Ind. App. 377, 386-88, 66 N.E. 1023,
1026 (1903). See also Dale v. School Dist. No. 9, 66 S.D. 346, 348, 283 N.W. 158,
160 (1938).
156. See Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Ore. App. 542, 544, 502 P.2d 1385, 1386-87 (1972);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 294.100(2) (1975).
157. See Clark v. George, 118 Kan. 667, 669, 236 P. 643, 644 (1925).
158. See Klauder v. Cox, 295 Pa. 323, 329-31, 145 A. 290, 291-92 (1929).
159. See id. at 332, 145 A. at 292. The court did recognize that bad faith actions
of legislators would subject them to liability.
160. See id. at 329-30, 145 A. at 292; Eaton v. Thayer, 124 Me. 311, 316, 128
A. 475, 477 (1925).
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public official such as the attorney general.' 6 ' An old federal district
court case, Mitchell v. Stephens,'6 2 presented a further rationale to
reject a California taxpayer's standing to recover money from state offi-
cers on behalf of the state. The court distinguished suits for damages
against local officials and stockholder suits. These suits require that
the local government and the corporation be named as defendants.
Similar suits against state officers cannot be permitted, the court
reasoned, because the state would have to be named a party but cannot
be so named because the doctrine of sovereign immunity forbids suing
the state without its consent. 163  Despite this decision and reasoning,
the argument has not been followed since the Muskopf v. Corning
Hospital District" decision of the California Supreme Court, which
declared that governmental immunity was an anachronism. 65 While
the legislature attempted to counteract the effect of the decision, the
statutes it enacted refer to the liability of the state when its officers
would be liable for injury to private individuals.' 66 The legislature did
nothing to forbid a taxpayer from suing an official in the name of the
state when there had been injury to the state.
In summary, the national development of taxpayers' suits has
included the extension of taxpayer standing to legal as well as equitable
actions. While only a minority of states permit such suits for damages,
few have directly rejected the extension. Consequently, by permitting
legal actions by taxpayers, the California decisions in Stanson v. Mott
and the earlier cases are not unique. Until the Stanson decision, how-
ever, almost all of the California cases which extended taxpayer stand-
ing to damage suits involved actions against local rather than state offi-
cers. Oregon appears to be the only other state in which a taxpayer
was permitted to seek legal relief on the state level. 167 However, in
Oregon such actions are provided by statute. Thus, it seems that Stan-
son is one of few precedents for the common law extension of taxpayer
standing to suits for legal relief against state officers.
Procedural Constraints on a Taxpayer's Ability
To Hold State Officers Liable
Although it has been clearly established in California that a tax-
payer may request equitable or legal relief against the misconduct of
state officers, there is one constraint on this ability which California
161. See Eaton v. Thayer, 124 Me. 311, 319, 128 A. 475, 476 (1925).
162. 285 F. 756 (S.D. Cal. 1922).
163. Id. at 760.
164. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
165. Id. at 213, 359 P.2d at 458, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
166. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 814-18.8 (West 1966 & Supp. 1976).
167. See Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Ore. App. 542, 502 P.2d 1385 (1972).
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courts should establish: a requirement that the attorney general or
other state official first refuse to prosecute a suit for a citizen to acquire
the right to press a taxpayer's action. This reasonable constraint would
provide the courts with a practical solution to the problem of vexatious
litigation which liberal rules for taxpayers' suits may provoke.
As has previously been noted, 6 8 the danger of vexatious litigation
posed by the extension of taxpayers' suits to the state level could plague
the courts. Because courts do not scrutinize the motives for taxpayers'
suits, 169 and because merely wasteful expenditures, not illegal in them-
selves may result in personal liability for state officers,1 70 suits brought
solely to harass officers may easily clog the courts. If the number of
these suits should expand, the normal flow of governmental affairs may
suffer because public officers will be forced to spend ever-increasing
amounts of time defending their actions in court. Section 526a con-
tains only a few requirements that would restrict either the number of
or the motives behind taxpayers' suits.
Section 526a, however, restricts the subject matter of injunctive
suits in at least one way: "[No injunction shall be granted restraining
the offering for sale, or issuance of any municipal bonds for public
improvements or public utilities."''7 However, this constraint is so
narrow that it is difficult to see how it could significantly limit the num-
ber of state taxpayers' suits. In addition, another restriction expressed
in section 526a has been stripped of any significance by court decisions.
The section describes the taxpayer who may bring suit as a "citizen resi-
dent" of the city and county on whose behalf he presses his suit. It
further requires that he be "assessed for" and "liable to pay, or, within
one year before the commencement of the action, [have] paid, a tax"
in the city or county. 72 Nevertheless, a nonresident taxpayer has been
permitted to sue in direct contradiction to the statutory requirement that
he be a "citizen resident.' 173  Furthermore, it has been held that a tax-
payer suit "rests not upon the payment of taxes by the taxpayer, but
upon the alleged illegal expenditure of such monies by the defending
public entity.' 74  This passage from Regents of University of Califor-
nia v. Superior Court suggests that the courts might "judicially repeal"
the requirement that a plaintiff must pay a tax, although the quoted
168. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
169. See note 109 & accompanying text supra.
170. See notes 118-22 & accompanying text supra.
171. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 526a (West Supp. 1976).
172. Id.
173. Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, 65 Cal. 2d 13, 18-20, 415 P.2d 769, 772,
51 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884-85 (1966).
174. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 529, 542, 476 P.2d 457,
466, 91 Cal. Rptr. 57, 66 (1970).
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passage concerned a different matter: venue of a taxpayer's suit. Con-
sequently, section 526a, on its face, may not impose any constraints on
the number or subject of state taxpayers' suits.
Nevertheless, there is one constraint upon local taxpayers' suits
which follows from the language of section 526a. This constraint, if
applied to suits against state officers, may help to deter the abuse of
taxpayer standing. In Keith v. Hammel,' 5 a mandamus action to com-
pel a sheriff to pay into the county treasury fees he had collected and
illegally retained, the court of appeal pointed out the proviso in section
526a which states: "This section does not affect any right of action in
favor of a county, city, town, or city and county, or any public officer.
From this language, the court determined that a prerequisite
exists to a taxpayer bringing suit. After citing this passage, the court
said:
From the many decisions of the courts of this and other states
dealing with this subject, we derive the principle that in the conduct
of the ordinary business of a county or city, where the care and
protection of the rights of the corporation have been committed to
public officers, the primary right goes with the duty belonging
to those officers to control the ordinary business of the corpora-
tion without the interference of private citizens, even though they
be taxpayers.
177
The court concluded that in order for the taxpayer to maintain an
action, it is necessary for him to show that the officer whose duty it
is to press such a claim 'against accused officers has refused to
prosecute.
Compliance with this prerequisite to bringing suit must be pleaded
by the plaintiff taxpayer.' 8  If he does not allege refusal to prosecute,
a demurrer will be sustained for failure to state a cause of action.'7 9
This requirement has been imposed to insure that suits will not be
brought at the mere "caprice" of individuals.' 80  Nevertheless, if it
appears that a demand on the officer to prosecute will be useless, the
demand will be held unnecessary although the fact of futility must be
pleaded.
181
Despite the fact that this requirement follows from the language
of section 526a, the appellate decisions in the taxpayers' cases that have
been brought against state officers have not discussed it. The conclu-
sion may be that the prerequisite does not apply in suits on the state
175. 29 Cal. App. 131, 154 P. 871 (1915).
176. Id. at 133, 154 P. at 872.
177. Id.
178. Gray v. White, 5 Cal. App. 2d 463, 467-68, 43 P.2d 318, 320 (1935).
179. Hansen v. Carr, 73 Cal. App. 511, 514-16, 238 P. 1048, 1049-50 (1925).
180. Gray v. White, 5 Cal. App. 2d 463, 467, 43 P.2d 318, 320 (1935).
181. Hansen v. Carr, 73 Cal. App. 511, 515-16, 238 P. 1048, 1049 (1925).
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level. However, such an interpretation would be inconsistent with sec-
tion 526a as a justification for state taxpayers' suits. The lack of dis-
cussion may imply that either the issue was not raised or the plaintiff
complied with the requirement. Nevertheless, evidence that the
requirement does not apply in suits against state officers is found in
California State Employees' Association v. Williams.82 In that case,
the court of appeal held that the plaintiff taxpayers' standing to sue
state officers was not impaired by the "concurrent power" of the State
Personnel Board to enforce civil service laws. 83 The court's opinion
does not indicate whether the board was asked to commence an action.
However, the reference to the "concurrent power" suggests that a
demand upon the appropriate public prosecutor need not be made.
Consequently, there appear to be no effective constraints upon tax-
payers' suits other than the time and money that is necessary to enable
an individual citizen to press his claim.
Conclusion
The California Supreme Court has only recently established that
taxpayers have standing to enjoin improper expenditures by state officers.
Courts in several cases from Ahlgren v. Carr in 1962 to Stanson v. Mott
in 1976 have permitted these suits. However, until Stanson v. Mott,
the law on state taxpayers' suits was unsettled. There had been sub-
stantial evidence supporting the argument that a state official could be
enjoined by a taxpayer only when he was acting on behalf of a local
government, such as a county or city. The statutory authority for tax-
payers' suits in California derives from section 526a of the Code of Civil
Procedure. By its language, the section only permits taxpayers' suits
against state officers who act as agents of local government. Conse-
quently, in order to determine whether all taxpayers' suits against state
officers were permitted, the statute required the kind of decision pro-
vided by Stanson v. Mott in which state officers were sued over
expenditures relating solely to state government.
This note has attempted to place the Stanson decision in its proce-
dural as well as its historical context. For instance, the alternative
remedies available to a citizen by which he can influence official con-
duct have been explored. However, their standing requirements as
well as their limited applicability makes these alternatives less effective
than taxpayers' suits as a check upon official misconduct. In addition,
the historical development of taxpayers' suits in California and in other
states was traced to explain the rationale for extending taxpayers' stand-
ing to the state level. The same reasoning that lay behind permitting
182. 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
183. Id. at 395, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
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a taxpayer to avoid complying with the "personal interest" rule of stand-
ing was found to apply equally well in suits against state officers. In
both types of cases, taxpayers' suits were held essential to insure the
availability of a remedy for official misconduct which might otherwise
go unchecked.
The California Supreme Court has relied upon section 526a as a
justification for state taxpayers' suits. This has led to speculation as
to the future effect of that section upon the refinement of state tax-
payers' standing. Much of the judicial precedent behind section 526a
has been analyzed in an attempt to indicate the ways in which the scope
of these suits will probably develop. The most far-reaching effect of
local taxpayers' suits has been the extension of taxpayer standing to
suits in which state officials have been held personally liable for
illegal expenditures of funds. Stanson v. Mott firmly established that
legal as well as equitable relief can be obtained against state officers
in a taxpayer's action.
The significance of taxpayers' suits, whether against state or
municipal officers, lies in the fact that the judicial process is the only
means by which the individual citizen is guaranteed an influence on
official conduct. In the end, the foundation of democratic government
rests in the individual. If he is unable to do no more than ratify in
the voting booth political decisions that have already been made or sup-
port with his vote some general policy trend that he favors, he is left
without the ability to influence the day-to-day affairs of state. These
daily decisions determine how far and in what direction our society will
advance. Consequently, the individual citizen must be able to take the
initiative through taxpayers' suits to keep government accountable on
the state as well as on the local level.
Steven Mains*
* Member, Third Year Class.
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